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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
HENRY EARLEY,
Respondent,
Case No.
7725

-vs.-

KARL L. JACKS·ON,
Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover damages sustained by
the plaintiff in an automobile accident that occurred on
Utah State Highway No. 3 near Laketown, Utah, on the
evening of April 3, 1950. The defendant, Merne V.
Muder, was never served with summons and the action
was tried against the defendant, Karl L. Jackson, alone.
Judgment was rendered against the defendant, Jackson,
and in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant, Jackson,
filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
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which was denied by the court. The appeal is from the
judgment and from the denial of the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.
The case was submitted to the jury by the trial court
on the question of the negligence of the defendant, the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff, and proximate
cause. The def~ndant contended, in the lower court, as he
does here, that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence which precluded his recovery. The plaintiff
contended that the negligence of the defendant was the
sole proximate cause of the accident. The case was submitted to the jury under appropriate instructions, from
which the defendant has not appealed, and the jury by
its verdict found that the negligence of the defendant was
the sole proximate cause of the accident.
The only question presented by this appeal is, therefore, whether there was sufficient evidence from which
the jury could determine that the negligence of the defendant was the sole proximate cause of the accident.
THE FACTS

For the most part the facts as set forth by the appellant in his brief are correct, but do not present the· situation in full from the respondent's standpoint. We will,
therefore, make our own statement of the facts as we
deem them material to our presentation of the case.
The accident occurred on April 3, 1950, at about
7:00-7:30 P.M., (R. 98), on Utah State Highway No.3,
(R. 99), approximately one-half a mile or more west of
Laketown, Utah, (R. 125). The weather was clear. It
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'Yas dark. The visibility ""as good and there 'vas no fog
or 1nist, ( R. 98, 109, 181, 199, 265). The high,vay proceeded in a general easterly and ""esterly direction, (R.
99), and 'Yas an oiled road approximately 20-21 feet in
w·idth, (R. 162). Near the point ""here the accident occurred a creek running north and south crosses under the
high,Yay in a culvert, (R. 99, 100). There was a gradual
drop of about 6 or 7 feet from the high,vay down to the
creek bed, (R. 104, 170). The road was straight and
practically level for a distance of a half a mile west of
the culvert at which point the· highway curved to the
north, (R. 100-101). It was also straight and level for a
considerable distance east of the culvert, (R. 100). There
,,,.as testimony that the shoulders on either side of the
highway were approximately 3-4 feet in width, (R. 101),
although this is not indicated by Exhibit 2 which was
introduced in evidence by the defendant to show the highway at the scene. There was testimony that there were
guard posts in place at the scene of the accident, and
one of the witnesses testified that these guard posts were
located at the edge of the hard surfaced portion of the
road, (R. 163). There was other evidence that the guard
posts were located at the edges of the shoulders, ( R.
103). There was testimony that it had rained in the afternoon and that the highway was damp at the time of the
accident, (R. 98). One witness testified that the highway was fairly dry, (R. 199), and one of the defendant's
'vi tnesses testified that there was a thin coating of ice
on the road, (R. 239). The photograph, Exhibit 2, was

introduced in evidence, looking east along the highway
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and showing the guard posts referred to by the witnesses.
A Ford one-half ton pick-up truck, (R. 105), which
the plaintiff Earley had been operating was parked on
the highway over the culvert headed northwest with the
front end thereof about a foot south of the center line,
(R. 106, 178, 210). The rear wheels were on the south
shoulder 2 or 3 fe~t off the oiled portion of the road
with the rear of the bed of the truck sticking out over
the edge of the culvert, (R. 106). It was stipulated between the parties that the truck which the plaintiff had
been operating was 13lh feet from the front bumper to
the furtherest rear portion of the rear tire and that the
overall length of the truck from the front bumper to
extreme rear portion of the bed of the truck was 15%
feet, (R. 215). The headlights on the Earley truck were
burning, (R. 111, 112, 268, 269).
At the time of the accident the plaintiff was running
down the north edge of the highway in a westerly direction waving his arms to warn the defendant's driver
who was proceeding east along the south side of the
highway toward the plaintiff's truck, (R. 111). There was
evidence that the plaintiff was 100-150 feet west of the
culvert, (R. 112, 146), and as close to the north edge of
the road as he could get, (R. 153-154). The plaintiff
testified that he could not very well have got entirely
off the the oiled portion of the road at that point, (R.
147). He further testified that there was at least 8 feet
between him and the center line on the north side of the
oiled portion of the road at the time of the accident, (R.
157). An examination of Exhibit 2 would confirm the
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plaintiff's contention that he could not very well get entirely off the oiled portion of the road. Plaintiff testified that he heard the brakes screech on the defendant's
vehicle and that 'vas the last thing he remembered, (R.
112). He testified that by his presence he had not blocked
the north half of the road, ( R. 1-±5) ; that he didn't kno\v
that the defendant's vehicle \vould have to turn to the left
but expected that it would stop as it could have done, (R.
1-!G). He further testified on re-direct examination that
he knew the position of the truck on the highway created
a hazard if someone came up th~ road at a high rate of
speed and 'vasn't \Yatching where he was going, but he
did not feel that his presence on the north edge of the
high,vay created a dangerous situation, (R. 157-158).
Earley was knocked or carried into the creek and following the accident was brought out of the creek by the witness Willis, (R. 230, 278, 279).
Roland Reese, a State Highway Patrolman, testified
that he investigated the accident a day or two following
its occurrence; that neither vehicle was present on the
scene at that time, (R. 161). He stated that he observed
some skid marks on the highway in the vicinity of the
culvert. These marks at the west end were about in the
middle of the highway, (R. 165); that they proceeded
for a distance of 114 feet 6 inches to the east at which
point they left the oiled portion of the highway; that
there \vere 30 more feet of skid marks on the north
shoulder, (R. 164); that the marks on the shoulder indicated that the vehicle was skidding sideways, (R. 165166), as it went over the culvert tearing up the gravel;
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that there was no physical evidence from which he could
deter1nine the position the plaintiff occupied on the highway at the time of the accident, (R. 167).
Harold Johnson testified that he arrived on the scene
of the accident at about 8 :00 P.M. on the evening of the
accident, (R. 175); that he saw the lights on the two vehicles involved in the accident when the car in which he
was riding was about one-half a mile to the east, (R. 176) ;
that he was present on the scene when they pulled the
plaintiff out of the creek, (R. 177); that the truck operated by the plaintiff was on the south side of the highway
leaning a little to the west of north with its lights burning
with the front bumper of the pick-up almost to the center
line, (R. 178). He observed the defendant's truck in a
slough, (R. 179), about 40 feet east of the culvert and
about 10-12 feet north of the highway. It was headed
south, (R. 179, 180) ; that he heard Muder, the defendant's
employee, say: "I was driving awful fast, and I hit him
awful hard and I'm afraid he is dead." (R. 183). He also
heard Muder say that he had not seen the Earley truck
at all but just saw the man out waving his hands, (R.
184, 186); that the defendant's truck had not come in contact with the truck which had been operated by the plaintiff at all, (R. 187) ; that he observed some skid marks
on the highway extending over to the point where the
defendant's vehicle came to rest; that they started about
100 feet west of the culvert and kind of zig zagged; that
as they got close to the culvert it looked as though the car
turned sideways and started to skid sideways about 20
or 25 feet west of the culvert where the rear wheels went
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off onto the north shoulder and n1ade n1arks in the gravel
over the rulYert to the point 'Yhere the defendant's vehicle rolled back,Yards into the slough, (R. 186).
Harold Johnson also testified that he observ:~d the
plaintiff's hat and glove on the north shoulder of the
road, (R. lSS), about 100 feet 'Yest of the culvert 'vhere
the first tracks 'Yere visible, (R. 187).
Farrell Johnson, another 'vitness, testified that he
had been tra\eling east along the high,vay and arrived
on the scene of the accident, (R. 195); that he observed
the Earley truck; that its lights were burning, and he had
seen the lights when he turned the bend a half a mile west
of the truck, (R. 196); that the Earley truck was facing
slightly northwest because he saw the lights when he
made the bend, (R. 196, 197); that he drove over the culvert past the Earley truck without difficulty and without leaving the paved portion of the highway, (R. 197) ;
that he observed the defendant's truck in the slough on
the north side of the road facing the highway about 25
feet east of the culvert with its front end 8 feet north of
the paved road, (R. 198) ; that later that evening he
made observations at the scene and followed tracks from
the point where the defendant's vehicle was in the slough
to the west until he could see them no longer; that they
started approximately 100 feet or maybe a little more
west of the culvert, (R. 202), and went diagonally across
the road until they reached a point approximately opposite where the Earley truck was sitting where the tracks
indicated that the hind wheels had swung around onto the
shoulder of the road; that the tracks continued east until
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the truck lost its momentum and evidently skidded backwards into the slough, (R. 203); that he found Earley's
glove lying on the north shoulder of the highway and his
hat a few feet from it on the ground about 50-75 feet west
of the culvert, (R. 204).
Lola Johnson, wife of Harold Johnson, also testified
that the Earley truck was headed in a diagonal northwesterly direction, (R. 210); that after they stopped on
the scene she ran down the orange line in the center of
the road beyond the truck and that the truck was to her
left as she was running west and she did not come in
contact with it so that it was all south of the center line,
(R. 210-211); that she saw black skidding marks on the
oil and a furrough dug along the road in the gravel on
the north shoulder; that she could not tell where the furrough in the gravel was with reference to the point where
the creek crossed under the highway, (R. 212); that she
heard the defendant's employee, Muder, say that he
couldn't believe that Earley was alive because he had hit
him so hard, (R. 214).
Sherman Lutz, who at that time was Deputy Sheriff
of Rich County, testified that he was notified of the accident about 10:05 P.M., (R. 217), and the following morning made an investigation; that from where the defendant's car came to rest in the slough he observed skid
marks extending to the west for a total distance of 144
feet 6 inches, (R. 218); that from the point where the
marks first started at the west to the point where they
left the oiled road on the north was 130 feet; that at the
west end the marks started on the south side of the high-
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way in the lane for eastbound traffic; that there were t'ro
sets of marks, one caused by each of the \vheels, and that
both sets at the 'vest end 'vere in the lane for eastbound
traffic, ( R. 219) : that according to the marks the car
traveled approximately 10 feet in the eastbound lane before turning to the north, ( R. 220) ; that the defendant's
truck stopped about 1:2 feet east of the culvert north of
the high,vay facing south, (R. 222).
Elijah C. \\Tillis testified that he lived about 1000
feet northwest of the culvert, (R. 228); that 'vhile at
home he noticed a car parked on the highway with the
lights toward his house; that he walked fro1n his home
towards the car; that when he was about 300 or 400 feet
away from the culvert he observed the defendant's vehicle
coming from the west, (R. 229); that it was about at
the bend in the road approximately one-half a mile away,
(R. 231) ; that he could hear the engine as it was making
a lot of noise at that time, (R. 235) ; that he did not see
the accident but pulled the plaintiff out of the creek and
thought he was dead, (R. 230); that he observed a hat
and one glove about on the edge of the oiled road at
a guard post approximately 45 feet west of where Mr.
Earley was in the creek, (R. 233). He admitted having
given a signed statement to Mr. Burns, one of the defendant's attorneys, in which he said: "When I was about 200
feet from the highway and as the moving truck was about
50-100 feet from the parked truck I heard a man yell and
I also heard the truck hit something, and I thought that
the truck had hit one of the guard posts." ( R. 239).
Merne V. Muder, the defendant's employee, testified
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that he was operating the defendant's 1948 three-quarter
ton Chevrolet pick-up truck at the time of the accident,
(R. 251), with the headlights burning on high beam, (R.
253); that he was traveling in an easterly direction along
the highway at a speed of 45-50 miles per hour, (R. 266,
267); that the road was straight for a half a mile west
of the culvert, (R. 253); that he had driven over the highway many times before and was thoroughly familiar with
it, (R. 252) ; that when he rounded the curve one-half
a mile west of the culvert, he observed the lights at Laketown and also the lights on a vehicle which was parked
by a pool hall in Laketown, (R. 254-255) ; that Laketown
was located about a half a mile east of the culvert, (R.
252).
"Q.

Now when you rounded the curve and enter
that straight stretch you had no difficulty insofar as your visibility was concerned in seeing the lights of an automobile clear over by
a pool hall in Laketown, about a mile away?
That is correct, isn't it?
A. . That's correct.
Q. And there wasn't any fog or any mist or anything that interfered with your visibility
then~

A.

Not in the position I was on the highway."
(R. 265)

Exhibit 3 was introduced in evidence and identified
as the defendant's truck which Muder was driving and
the witness Muder testified that the damage shown thereon was that caused in the accident, (R. 262-263).
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Muder further testified on cross exa1nination as follows:
'~Q.

K O"\Y you stated that as you "\vere coming do,vn
the high,Yay at a speed of forty five, where
you state it might be as high as fifty miles an
hour, that yon observed a light on the high"\Yay, a light or lights. Did you see just one
Or t"\VO lights-? VVhat did you see~
A. It gave me the impression it was a small, low
burning, dim light.

Q.
A.
"Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

* * *
Which way did it give you the impression
that that vehicle on which you observed this
small, dim light was headed~
\V. ell, after I had seen the light I could see
that the pickup was across the lane behind
me." (R. 267)
Headed which way~
North.
* * * Was it headed straight north or was it
at an angle, one way or the other~
I couldn't say positive.
* * *
In any event, there was no lights on that vehicle that were facing directly towards you,
or in your general area~
No sir." (R. 268)
*

*

*

"Q.

And you weren't blinded by the lights of any
westbound vehicles?
A. No sir.
Q. And then when you were two to three hundred feet away you distinctly saw a low light~
A. Yes sir.'' (R. 268)
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"Q. And where did that light appear to
what part of the highway~
A. Pretty close to center, I would say.

be~

On

* *

*
Q. At that time you didn't know what it was, did
you~

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

I had my impression of it.
You didn't know definitely~
No, I didn't know definitely.
You knew there was something there, though~
Yes.
And then you applied your brakes, you said,
when you were two to three hundred feet
away~

A.

Yes." (R. 269)

* * *
"Q. Well, weren't you concerned about bringing
your vehicle under control so that whatever
this light might be that was up there in the
center of the road that you could stop if need
be~

A.

I wanted to bring it to a stop and keep it
under control while I was doing so, yes." (R.
269)
* * *
"Q. And you had pressure on the brake pedal
from that time up until the time you saw Mr.
Earley, didn't you~
A. Yes." (R. 270)
• * *
"Q.

* * * Now when did you first see the outline of
a vehicle on the highway~ How far away were
you when you saw it, saw an outline of a vehicle~

A.

I saw it I guess what you would call most
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right, right approximately about the same
time I sa "T the light; just a second later maybe.
Q. ,,~ell, how close were you to it' How far did
you travel fron1 the time you had first observed this lo'v glowing light in the middle
of the high\\~ay until you could tell what it was
up there on the highway' How far did you
travel·?
A. Oh, !-probably fifty feet." (R. 270)

* * *
"Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

So you 'Yere two to three hundred feet away
"Then you first saw it and then you traveled
about fifty feet when you could tell it was a
vehicle up there, is that right~
Yes.
N o'v at that time could you tell where the vehicle was on the highway~
Yes.
Well, where was it~
Across my lane.
All right. How far did the front of it project
out on to the highway~ Could you tell at that
time~

A.

Well, I saw, my impression was slightly over
the yellow line." (R. 271)

* •

•

"Q. You knew there was a culvert there~ You
have gone over this road thirty six times before, did you know that was in the general
area where the creek was~
A. Yes.
Q. You knew that at that time when you were
two hundred to two hundred fifty feet away~
A. Yes.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14

Q. Did you put your brake on harder at that
time~

A.

Yes." (R. 271-272)

* * *
"Q. I mean when you were two hundred to two
hundred fifty feet away you didn't even know
then that you could even get past that truck,
did you~
A. I didn't, no. No, not positive, no." (R. 272)
* * *
"Q. Then you continued with the increased pressure on the brake from that point down until
you saw Mr. Earley~
A. Well, it may have been a little more.

* * *
- Q. It kept getting more all of that time~
A. That's right.
Q. Where did you say Mr. Earley was; how far
from the truck when he got hit~
THE COURT: You mean the parked truck~
Q. The parked truck, not yours.
A. Thirty or forty feet." (R. 274)
* * *
"Q. Well, it could have been as close as thirty
feet to the parked truck and it might have
been as far as fifty, is that correct~
A. That's right." (R. 274)
* * *
"Q. And when you first saw Mr. Earley where
was he on the road~
A. The way it appeared to me it was close to the
center of the south lane·, north lane.
Q. Well, you mean he was about in the middle
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of the \vest bound lane of traffic~ Is that what
you mean~
A. Yes sir." (R. 275)

uQ. \Y. ell, as you \Vere going straight dovvn the
road \vith your lights on high beam they
\vere illuminating all of that twenty foot strip
of road·? There isn't any doubt in your mind
about that, is there~
A. Ko.
* * *
Q. And yet you didn't see ~Ir. Earley until you
got \vithin t\venty to thirty feet of him~
A. No sir." (R. 276)
*

*

*

Well, when you were two hundred feet away
you started moving over to the north half of
the road, is that right~
A. That's right.
Q. And from that time on your lights, if anything, would be more concentrated on the
north half of the road than any other part
of the road, wouldn't they~
A. Yes.
Q. So for a distance of two hundred feet from
the point of the accident, or the point where
the truck was stopped your lights were illuminating very clearly all of the north half of
the road and you were braking during all of
that time~
A. That's right.
Q. How fast were you going when you first sa\v
Mr. Earley~
A . . _ ¥Y judgment on it would be around twenty
five miles an hour." (R. 277)

"Q.
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* * *
"Q. Now when you saw him you said you applied
your brakes very heavily, is that correct~
A. Yes.'' (R. 278)
"Q.
A.
Q.
A.
"Q.

A.
Q.

* * *
And you hit Mr. Earley with such force when
you hit him that you smashed in the whole
left front portion of that hood, didn't you~
I did, yes.
And you also damaged part of the grille~
Yes." (R. 278)
And then after hitting him you either knocked
or carried him from a point thirty to fifty feet
west of the truck into the creek on the culvert
of which the truck was stopped, didn't you~
Yes.
That would mean he was kno-cked or carried
from the point of impact about thirty to fifty
feet~

A. Yes.
Q. And then how far after that did your truck
travel from where the Earley truck was ·
stopped on the road'
A. Well, I would say-I couldn't say positive on
it.
Q. Well, approximately' .
A. Probably ten or fifteen feet east and off
north, off the road.
Q. And how far off the road'
A. To the bottom of the embankment where it
starts up." (R. 278-279)

* * *
"Q. Now part of this distance that you were
traveling after you struck Mr. Earley you
were in a sideward skid, weren't you 7
A. Yes." (R. 279)
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~~Q.

• • * So that after yon hit 1\[r. Earley and

knocked him approximately thirty to fifty
feet your car still had enough momentum so it
'vent into a sideward skid and skidded approximately thirty feet~
. A... Yeah, off on an angle. It wasn't a straight
slide." (R. 280)
:\I uder testified that there was no contact at all
between the car " . hich he " . as driving and the parked
truck, (R. 280).
~Iuder testified that there 'vas no mist, fog, or anything to interfere with his visibility, (R. 265, 282), and
that regardless of sidelights or flares he had no difficulty
in seeing the outline of the truck at a distance of 200250 feet, (R. 284).
POINTS
The defendant contends that the plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law. First,
it is claimed that the Earley vehicle was unlawfully
parked upon the highway; Second, that there were no
flares or lights to warn of the presence of the Earley
vehicle; and, Third, that the plaintiff unlawfully ran
down the north side of the highway when by law he should
have proceeded down the left side thereof. All of these
matters merely presented questions of fact for the jury
to consider in determining the proximate cause of the
accident. In answer to appellant's brief the respondent
sets forth the following points:
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I. Whether the position in which the Earley truck
was parked on the highway at the time of the accident
proximately contributed to the accident was a question
of fact to be decided by the jury.
II. Whether the absence of flares or warning lights
on the Earley truck proximately contributed to the accident was a question of fact for the jury.
III. Whether the action of the plaintiff in running
down the north edge of the highway toward the defendant's vehicle proximately contributed to the accident was
a question of fact to be decided by the jury.
IV. The position of the Earley truck on the highway combined with Earley's action in running down the
north edge of the highway to warn the on coming vehicle
did not as a matter of law proximately contribute to the
accident.
ARGUMENT
I. WHETHER THE POSITION IN WHICH THE EARLEY TRUCK WAS PARKED ON THE HIGHWAY AT THE
TIME OF THE ACCIDENT PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTED
TO THE ACCIDENT WAS A QUESTION OF FACT TO BE
DECIDED BY THE JURY.

The Earley vehicle was parked on the south side of
the highway over the culvert headed northwest with the
front end thereof about a foot south of the center line of
the highway. The defendant claims that this constituted
negligence under Section 57-7-165 of the Utah Code.
It was nonetheless for the jury to determine whether such
negligence proximately contributed to the accident. See
4 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law & Practice,
Part 2, Sec. 2683 :
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·· . .-\s to contributory negligence, the rule is
that the fact that one is Yiola ting a statute or
ordinance, at the tilne of rereiving an injury of
"\Yhich he complains, is not conclusive so as to bar
his recovery for the injury. In other words, while
such Yiolation n1ay constitute negligence, in order
that it may be available as a defense, it must further be sho,vn that it proximately contributed to
the accident."
At page 19 of his brief defendant cites the California
case of Thomson v. Bayless (1944) 150 Pac. (2) 413,
which construed a provision of the California Motor Vehicle Code exactly similar to the Utah Statute. In that
case the California Supreme Court in affirming the
jury's verdict, sets forth the general rule governing such
cases, as follows :
"It has recently been held that whether or
not parking on the highway in violation of Section 582 of the Vehicle Code constitutes a proximate cause of the accident where the driver of the
car in motion might also have been negligent, is a
question of fact for the jury if reasonable men can
differ thereon. Inai v. Ede, 59 Cal. App. 2d 549,
555, 139 P. 2d 76; see, also, opinion on prior appeal, 42 Cal. A pp. 2d 521, 526, 527, 109 P. 2d 400;
cf. Fennessey v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 20 Cal. 2d
141, 124 P. 2d 51; Mason v. Crawford, supra."
In the case at bar the jury by its verdict found that
the position in which the Earley truck was parked on the
highway did not proximately contribute to the accident.
The jury's verdict should, therefore, ·stand.
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II. WHETHER THE ABSENCE OF FLARES OR WARNING LIGHTS ON THE EARLEY TRUCK PROXIMATELY
CONTRIBUTED TO THE ACCIDENT WAS A QUESTION OF
FACT FOR THE JURY.

The defendant relies upon Section 57-7-191 of the
Utah Code to show that there should be sufficient lights
to reveal the presence of the vehicle at a distance of 500
feet and also relies upon Sections 57-7-212 and 57-7-213
requiring vehicles disabled upon the highway to exhibit
flares, lanterns or reflectors at stated distances in front
of and behind the vehicle.
It is undisputed in this case that there were no flares
around the Earley truck. However, the evidence clearly
shows that the headlights on the vehicle were burning
and that the vehicle was headed northwest upon the highway. The evidence further discloses that the defendant's
driver actually saw a light in the middle of the highway
when he was 200-300 feet away and clearly saw the outline of the Earley truck on the highway when he vvas
200-250 feet away from it. Farrell Johnson, one of the
plaintiff's witnesses, testified that he observed the lights
on the Earley truck when he rounded the bend a half a
mile west of the truck. The defendant's driver admitted
that visibility was good and that as he rounded the curve
a half a mile west of the scene of the accident he was
able to see the lights burning in Laketown a mile away
and at that point could clearly see the headlights on a vehicle in Laketown which was parked by a pool hall there.
The defendant's witness, Elijah C. Willis, testified that
he lived 1000 feet northwest of the culvert on which the
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Earley truck 'Yas parked and that 'Yhile at his ho1ne he
observed the lights on the Earley truck as it was parked
on the high,Yay. Other 'vitnesses 'Yho came fro1n the east
testified that they had observed the lights on the Earley
truck and the defendant's truck ""'hen they were a half a
mile to the east.
The purpose of a statute requiring lights or the placing of flares, reflectors or other devices is simply to give
adequate 'Yarning of the presence of the vehicle. Where
as in this case, there was actual and adequate notice of
the presence of the vehicle the absence of flares, reflectors or other types of warning lights was wholly immaterial. The defendant's driver actually saw the light
on the Earley truck when he was 250-300 feet away and
actually saw the outline of the Earley truck on the highway when he was 200-250 feet away. He, therefore, knew
in ample time of the presence of the defendant's vehicle
on the highway and knew that it was parked crosswise
in his lane headed north blocking the eastbound lane of
travel. Furthermore, in view of the testimony of other
witnesses and particularly that of Farrell Johnson and
of Elijah Willis the jury could very readily have found
that the defendant's driver saw or should have seen the
light on the Earley truck when he rounded the curve approximately a half a mile to the west, or at least when he
was within 1000 feet of the truck. It was for the jury
under this evidence to determine whether any negligence
in this particular proximately caused the accident. See
4 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law & Practice,
Part 2, Sec. 2632 :
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"The negligence of a driver in failing to have
proper lights is not of itself actionable, nor will
such negligence preclude recovery for injuries sustained in an automobile accident, if it is not the
proximate cause of the accident; otherwise if
such failure is the proximate cause of the accident."

* * *
"The failure of a vehicle to carry lights as
required by the law is immaterial if the unlighted
vehicle was nevertheless plainly seen, or could
have been plainly seen by the exercise of ordinary
care, in time to avoid a collision, * * * .''
The case of Duncan v. Madr·id, 101 Pac. (2) 382
(New Mex. 1940) cited at page 24 of the appellant's brief,
was tried in the lower court with·out a jury. The appellate
court merely held that there was sufficient evidence to
support the findings and decisions of the lower court.
The case of Paulsen, et al. v. Spencer, 177 Pac. (2)
597 (Calif.) cited at page 24 of appellant's brief specifically held that it was for the jury to determine whether
the absence of lights on the vehicle was a proximate
cause of the accident. The California Court in that case
said:
"The appellants first contend that it must
be held, as a matter of law, that the respondent
was guilty of negligence and that such negligence
proximately resulted in the death of Paulsen.
While there is some evidence indicating that the
respondent parked his car as well off the pavement as was reasonably possible under the circumstances, there would seem to be no question that
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he \Yas negligent in not at least leaving a rear light
lighted, as required by section 627 (c) of the Motor
\"'" ehicle Code. H ou·ever, a question of fact was
presented as to whether that negligence was a
proxinzate ca1.tse of the death of Pa~tlsen. This is
true because of the other circumstances which
appear, \Yith the reasonable inferences therefrom,
\Yhich \Yill be referred to in connection with the
next point raised." (Italics ours)
The other circumstances \Yere that road on which
the accident occurred was straight and afforded a clear
view for at least three-eighths of a mile toward the
parked car. The court stated that it must therefore be
presumed that the deceased had lights of the strength
required by the vehicle code to disclose the presence of
the unlighted vehicle on the highway and that the question was, therefore, one for the jury.
The Thfontana Supreme Court adopted the same
view in the case of Ashley v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 47
Pac. (2d) 53, cited at pages 24 and 25 of appellant's
brief. There the truck was parked partially on the highway with no lights burning thereon either front or rear.
In referring to the Montana statute which requires every
motor vehicle to display two white lights in front and
one light in the rear, the court said:
"A violation of this statute constitutes negligence. Simpson v. Miller, 97 Mont. 328, 34 P. (2d)
528. Whether such negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident or whether plaintiff was barred by reason of contributory negligence of Kitt
was a question for the jury. McNair v. Berger, 92
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Mont. 441, 15 P. (2d) 834; Fulton v. Chouteau
County Farmers' Co., supra." (Italics ours)
It was for the jury in the case at bar to determine
whether the absence of flares or other warning signs on
or about the Earley truck proximately contributed to the
accident. The jury found by its verdict that there was
no contributory negligence on the plaintiff's part in this
connection which proximately contributed to the accident.
Under the facts of this case, there was ample evidence
to support the jury in its finding. Its verdict, therefore,
should not be disturbed.
III. WHETHER THE ACTION OF THE PLAINTIFF IN
RUNNING DOWN THE NORTH EDGE OF THE HIGHWAY
TOWARD THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE PROXIMATELY
CONTRIBUTED TO THE ACCIDENT WAS A QUESTION OF
FACT TO BE DECIDED BY THE JURY.

The appellant in his brief quotes from the Utah cases
of Reid v. Owen, 93 Pac. (2) 680, 98 Utah 50, Mingus
v. Olsson, 201 Pac. (2) 495, and Sant v. Miller, 206 Pac.
( 2) 719. All of these cases involve pedestrians who were
crossing the highway and who were held to be contributorily negligent as a matter of law as they either did
not look or failed to see the oncoming automobile before
crossing its path. None of these cases are in point because the plaintiff in this case was not crossing the highway and was not crossing the path of the automobile.
The plaintiff was proceeding down the north edge of
the highway and the defendant's automobil~ until the
brakes were applied an instant before the plaintiff was
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struck \Yas proceeding along the south side of the high\Yay. It 'vas not until the brakes were applied and the car
apparently S\Yerved to the left that the plaintiff was in
any apparent danger, and it \Yas then too late for hin1 to
avoid the accident as he testified that he was struck immediately after he heard the screech of brakes.
The appellant cites Section 57-7-46 of the Utah Code
which requires a pedestrian when practicable to walk on
the left side of the roadway facing the traffic which may
approach from the opposite direction. The purpose of
this statute is that a pedestrian shall so walk that he can
see traffic which is approaching from the opposite direction, and will be in no danger of being struck from
the rear. Here the plaintiff was not struck from the
rear and was in fact facing the traffic which was proceeding in the opposite direction. As far as he was concerned
it was immaterial that he was on the north edge of the
road. Furthermore, it was likewise wholly immaterial
from the defendant's standpoint. The defendant's driver
testified that when he was 250-300 feet away from the
Earley truck his headlights were illuminating the road
for its entire width and that he had a clear and unobstructed vision ahead; that he was not blinded by the
lights of any vehicles approaching from the opposite
direction. The plaintiff's presence on the north edge
of the highway should, therefore, have been discovered
by the defendant's driver just as readily as though he
had been proceeding on the south side of the highway.
Furthermore, this Court has held that it is for the jury
to determine whether the negligence of a pedestrian in
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walking on the right hand side of the highway with his
back to approaching traffic proximately contributes to
the accident. See Roach v. Kyremes, ------· Utah______ , 211
Pac. ( 2) 181 (1949), where this court held:
"Appellant first contends the court erred in
failing to direct a verdict in his favor because respondent was guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law by walking in or along the right
hand side of the highway because in so doing,
she voluntarily placed herself in a perilous position. In determining whether a plaintiff is contributorily negligent as a matter of law, the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom
must be viewed in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Considered from this standpoint, there
is evidence that respondent and Miss Sickler were
not walking on the main travelled portion of the
highway but out on the west shoulder ; that they
maintained a lookout for approaching traffic by
glancing to the rear; that they moved farther
over on the shoulder as automobiles approached;
and, that they saw no light from defendant's car
nor did they hear it approach. Under circumstances such as these, it cannot be said that all
reasonable men must conclude that respondent
failed to exercise due care for her own safety."
See also Chatelain v. Thackeray, 98 Utah 525, 100
Pac. (2d) 191. In that case the plaintiff was walking
along the right hand side of the highway with his back
to approaching traffic when he was struck by a vehicle
proceeding in the same direction as he. The plaintiff
testified that he was walking at a point about 3 feet east
of the hard surfaced portion of the highway on the
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gravelled shoulder, and the defendant's testimony 'vas
that the plaintiff 'vas "~alking about 3 feet out on the hard
surfaced road. It 'vas contended by the defendant that
the plaintiff in thus 'valking on the right hand side of
the road 'vith his back to approaching traffic 'vas guilty
of contributory negligence as a n1atter of law. The court
held that the question of contributory negligence was
properly submitted to the jury and the jury having found
against the defendant, the appellate court was bound
thereby.
See also Hooker v. Schuler, (Ida.) 260 Pac. 1027, in
which the Idaho court held that a pedestrian walking on
the right hand side of the highway contrary to a statute
similar to the Utah statute was not guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law, stating as follows:
"The trial court properly submitted the question of whether respondent's walking on the righthand side of the road, or the negligent manner in
which appellant handled his car, or the existence
of defective brakes on his car, was the proximate
cause of the injury, and it was certainly a question
for the jury to determine what was the proximate
cause of the injury complained of under proper
instructions by the court."
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that it was
for the jury to determine whether the defendant was
negligent in running along the north edge of the highway toward the approaching car and whether such negligence, if any, was the proximate cause of the accident.
The verdict of the jury clearly indicated that the sole
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proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of
the defendant and that there was no contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff which proximately contributed to the accident. The jury's verdict on this point
should stand.
IV. THE POSITION OF THE EARLEY TRUCK ON THE
HIGHWAY COMBINED WITH EARLEY'S ACTION IN RUNNING DOWN THE NORTH EDGE OF THE HIGHWAY TO
WARN THE ONCOMING VEHICLE DID NOT AS A MATTER
OF LAW PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTE TO THE ACCIDENT.

For the purpose of this appeal the court must adopt
the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff. In this connection there was evidence that the Earley truck was
parked on the highway over the culvert headed northwest with its front end about a foot south of the center
line of the highway leaving the entire north half of the
highway and one foot of the south portion of the highway open for traffic. The evidence was undisputed that
the highway was straight and practically level for a
distance of one half a mile to the west; that there was no
fog, mist or anything in any way to interfere with visibility; that the headlights on the Earley truck were
properly burning. There was also evidence to indicate
that the plaintiff at the time of the accident was 150 feet
west of his truck on the north edge of the paved road as
close as he could ·get and that it was impractical at that
point for the plaintiff to get entirely off the oiled portion
of the road; that there was at least 8 feet between the
plaintiff and the center line of the highway on the north

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29
side of the oiled road at the tin1e of the accident. There
"?as the positive eYidence of the defendant's driver that
he sa\v a lo\v din1 light about in the center of the high,va.y
w·here he kne'v the culvert to be \Yhen he \vas 250-300 feet
a\\~ay, and that \vhen he \vas within 200-250 feet he could
clearly detect that the object on the highway in front of
him from which the light was coming was a truck which
\vas crosswise on the highway in his lane headed north
with its front end partially over the north side of the
highway; that defendant's driver at that time did not
know whether he could safely pass to the north in front
of the object and felt it advisable to bring his vehicle
under control so that he could stop if need be. The defendant 9-river's positive testimony also indicated that
the lights on the defendant's vehicle were burning on
high beam and clearly illuminated the highway for its
entire width, but that the defendant did not see the plaintiff until he was within 20-30 feet of him. There was evidence from other witnesses from which the jury could
have determined that the defendant's driver in the exercise of due care should have ascertained the presence of
the Earley truck on the highway when he was one-half
a mile to the west thereo.f. There was testimony concerning brake marks from which the jury could determine
at the time the brakes on the defendant's truck were first
applied, that the defendant's vehicle at that time was on
the south side of the road with all four wheels in the lane
for eastbound traffic. There was further testimony
which, if believed by the jury, would support a conclusion that the defendant's driver never saw the Earley
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truck on the highway in front of him and that its presence
accordingly had nothing whatsoever to do with the accident. Under this evidepce the jury certainly could have
found that the defendant's driver saw or should have
seen the plaintiff's presence on the highway and the
position of his truck in ample time to have stopped or
brought his vehicle under control so as to have avoided
the accident.
There was evidence from one of the witnesses that
the brake marks caused by the defendant's truck zig
zagged across the highway. Another witness testified
the defendant's truck made a furrow in the gravel on
the north shoulder. The jury would thus have been entitled to find under the evidence most favorable to the
plaintiff that when the plaintiff was 150 feet west of his
truck and on the north edge of the paved road, that the
defendant's truck was then on the south half of the paved
road; that when the brakes on the defendant's truck were
applied, it swerved to the north and struck the plaintiff.
The plaintiff at a point 150 feet west of the truck and on
the north edge of the road should not have anticipated
any danger from the defendant's vehicle which was approaching him on the south side of the road. In view of
the distance between him and his truck and the position
which he occupied on the extreme north edge of the paved
road he would have no reason to anticipate that the defendant's driver would suddenly turn to the north and
strike him or that he would apply his brakes and cause his
vehicle to go out of control and cross to the north side
of the road and strike him.
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The appellant. in his brief claims that the Earley
truck blocked one-half of the high,Yay and that Earley
by his presence on tl1e north edge of the paved road
blocked the other half of the highway and the only
lane in 'Yhich the defendant's driver could have proceeded. \\~ e submit that this is not the case. There was
150 feet bet,veen the plaintiff and his truck and there
was 6-8 feet of road on the north side of the center of
the highway and all of the south half of the highway up
to the truck on which the defendant's driver could have
proceeded without even striking the plaintiff or the truck.
If the defendant's driver had been keeping a proper lookout and had his vehicle under proper control, when he
first observed the low light or earlier if the jury found
that he should have seen the light on the highway earlier,
there would have been ample room on the highway between the plaintiff and his truck on which the defendant's
truck could have been driven in avoiding the plaintiff
and in passing around the Earley vehicle if it could not
have come to a complete stop.
It is further claimed by appellant in his brief that
the plaintiff had an opportunity to avoid the accident
at any time by stepping off the traveled portion of the
highway. In this connection there was no reason for the
plaintiff to step off the traveled portion of the highway
until it was too late to avoid the accident. After all, he
was on the extreme north edge of the paved road, and
there was evidence that the defendant's truck was proceeding on the south half of the paved road. Earley
testified that he heard the screech of brakes and the next
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instant he was struck. The jury from this and other
evidence could infer that the defendant's vehicle was
being operated at a high and excessive rate of speed;
that it was on the south half of the road until the brakes
were applied when it swerved to the left and struck the
plaintiff, who under such circumstances had no opportunity whatsoever to step off the highway and avoid the
accident. Until the defendant's vehicle indicated that it
was turning to the left or was going to .proceed toward
the side of the highway which the plaintiff was occupying there was no reason for him to move further off the
paved portion of the road. There was evidence from
which the jury could reasonably infer that the defendant's vehicle did not turn to the left until the brakes were
applied, and that it was then too late for the plaintiff to
avoid the accident. There is also testimony in the record
that the plaintiff could not very well get entirely off the
paved portion of the highway at that point and the photo
of the highway, Exhibit No. 2, would support the plaintiff in this contention.
Based upon the skid marks caused by the defendant's
vehicle, the damage done to the vehicle, the distance it
knocked or carried the plaintiff, and the distance of its
sideward skid and the point where it came to rest, the
jury could well have determined that the sole proximate
cause of the accident was the speed at which the defendant's vehicle was being opera ted and the failure of the
defendant's employee to keep a proper lookout causing
him to suddenly apply the brakes and throw his vehicle
out of control and into the plaintiff.
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The appellant at page :28 of his brief cites the case
of Keller v. Brennenzan, (Wash. 1929) 279 J>ac. 588. In
that case the plaintiff's truck becan1e stalled on the high\Yay and the plaintiff \Yas \valking near the center of the
high\Yay \Yhen he \Yas struck by an automobile. The court
held that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, but that case is distinguishable from the instant
case on its facts. The plaintiff's vehicle became. stalled
near the top of a steep grade with a sharp turn to the
right beyond the grade. The plaintiff was in front of his
vehicle but still not at the top of the grade when the
defendant's vehicle came around the curve and approached the top of the grade from the op·posite direction.
Because of the curve and the grade the defendant's lights
did not light up the highway in front of him. and he did
not see the truck or the plaintiff until it was too late to
avoid the accident. In the case at bar the highway was
straight and level for a distance of a half a mile to the
west and there was nothing to interfere with the vision
or view of the defendant's driver, and, as a matter of fact,
he saw the vehicle and should have seen the presence
of the plaintiff upon the highway in ample time to have
avoided the accident.
See Hanson v. Aldrich, 201 N.W. 778 (Iowa). There
the plaintiff's vehicle became stalled on the road and the
plaintiff hearing the defendant's car approaching from
the rear walked a few feet directly behind his own car
waving his arms to warn the defendant to stop, but the
defendant struck the plaintiff causing him injury. The
court held that the plaintiff was not guilty of contribu-
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tory negligence as a matter of law; that he had a right
to rely on the fact that the defendant would observe
the law of the road and turn out. The court affirmed
a judgment in plaintiff's favor, stating that the defendant
had ample space to pass the plaintiff and his car on the
highway and that the plaintiff was not called upon to anticipate negligence on the part of the driver of the other
car, stating:
"The evidence shows that the defendant saw
the plaintiff and his car at such a distance that
the collision could in all probability have been
averted. The lights on the Aldrich car were in
good condition, and disclosed objects in its pathway at least 75 feet in advance of his car. Plaintiff
could not know that defendant had no intention
of stopping or turning to the left. Plaintiff had
reason to think that he was within a zone of reasonable safety."
Considering the evidence as a whole, there was ample
to support the jury in its conclusion that the negligence
of the defendant was the sole proximate cause of the
accident.
CONCLUSION
We submit that the issues of negligence, contributory
negligence and proximate cause were properly referred
to the jury by the trial court; that there was ample evidence on vvhich the jury could determine and did determine, that the negligence of the defendant was the sole
proximate cause of the accident. The plaintiff, therefore,
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could not be held guilty of contributory negligence as a
n1a.tter of law. The defendant's motion for a directed
verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
were properly denied. The judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RICH & STRONG,
Attorneys for Respondent
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